The Domestication of South Korean Pre-College Study Abroad in the First Decade of the Millennium

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This essay examines a shift in the newspaper discourse on South Korean pre-college study abroad (chogi yuhak)—the education exodus of pre-college students—in order to consider how South Koreans are managing the considerable social pressure to globalize their children. While in the early years of Pre-College Study Abroad (PSA) in the 1990s, there was a robust media discourse about the promise of alternative human development through PSA, as the phenomena grew dramatically into the 2000s, the discourse increasingly asserts that PSA success relies on technical preparation at home, the student’s pre-existing character, and parental assets. PSA has thus been “domesticated” in that it is understood not as a discrete education field abroad, but instead an extension of South Korea’s highly stratified and competitive education market. This shift reflects escalating social and economic anxieties, and as such, the discourse constitutes a conversation about inequality in contemporary South Korea.

In this article, we examine the newspaper discourse on South Korean pre-college study abroad (chogi yuhak, hereafter PSA), namely the education exodus of pre-college students, from the mid-1990s into the presidential regime of Lee Myung-bak (Yi Myŏng-bak 2008–). While recent pre-college study abroad could include short-term attendance at summer language institutes or even vacationing abroad in China, Singapore, Philippines, Canada, and the United States, the discourse we examine here focuses on South Korean pre-college children attending yearlong schooling abroad for one or more years. We document a considerable shift in the discourse: from early optimism about PSA’s

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potential to fashion alternative human development to a consideration of considerable pre-existing resources required for PSA success. We refer to “domestication,” to signal the increasing awareness that PSA is but an extension of South Korean schooling and social stratification. Critical to this shift in the discourse are escalating social and economic anxieties about young people’s futures in post-IMF South Korea, increasing bifurcation of South Korea’s class structure, and the maturation and escalation of PSA which has resulted in widespread acknowledgment of both the inevitability of PSA desires and the fragility of PSA success. We use “success” broadly to index academic achievements that secure class reproduction and/or mobility.

We argue that in the early years of PSA, prior to its real takeoff in the mid-2000s, some South Koreans espoused the promise of alternative human development, namely that with time abroad young people’s potential, character, and global competitiveness would significantly improve. Specifically, this exodus discourse purported that PSA would fashion more creative, individualized subjects who would be primed to function more effectively in a globalizing and ever more competitive world. Although the notion of alternative human development is sustained into PSA’s maturity in the millennium, it is overshadowed by a more practical discourse of success in South Korea’s social order.

As pre-college study abroad (PSA) increased dramatically and was embraced (at least potentially) as a personal or familial strategy for a wide spectrum of South Koreans, the nature of the reporting changed considerably. The discourse came to assert that PSA success relies both on technical preparation at home, as well as on particular kinds of personhood or character that must be nurtured in the family prior to PSA. This change reflects both South Korea’s transformed social, economic, and cultural circumstances and the global neoliberal transformation of educational markets, namely their privatization, liberalization, and specialization. The transformed representation makes clear that PSA is by no means an exit strategy by which most South Koreans can equally succeed. Quite to the contrary, ideal PSA trajectories and outcomes are portrayed as nearly unattainable and unreachable by the rank-and-file.

With this discourse on the various capital required for success, we argue that PSA is no longer depicted as a discrete, foreign education field, but instead an extension of the highly stratified and competitive domestic South Korean education market. “Domesticated,” PSA has come to play by the same rules as the South Korean education game. Education abroad then becomes but another piece of the education puzzle as South Korean parents attempt to prepare their children to prosper in an ever more competitive and globalized South Korea and world. Considerable research makes the argument that international education and PSA-type transnational family migration represent modes of capital accumulation for the reproduction of the upper classes. We assert that the discourse of the domestication of PSA can be appreciated as a commentary on the role of international education in underwriting class interests. Indeed, the discourse engages the esca-
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In this vein, we argue that the escalating media coverage of PSA works in part as a stage for the rehearsal of deep-seated social and economic anxieties. As PSA is regularized as a piece of South Korean education preparation—a quite commonplace part of many students’ trajectory—PSA parents and children are increasingly portrayed as an inevitable outcome of South Korea’s contemporary predicament. They are not portrayed as a subject ripe for social critique as in the case of the successful super-rich forsaking their ethnic brethren and the failed “spoiled rich kids” (as was the case in the early discourse). Instead, PSA emerges as an almost inevitable course at which few are likely to succeed. While those lacking capital seem destined for failure, even those equipped with the full array of assets cannot count on PSA translating easily into a secure future.

While we certainly do not want to proclaim that PSA offers no “real” returns, with “domestication” we observe that the media is increasingly taking stock of competition and the global working of capital. While the data in our paper is limited to an analysis of newspaper discourse, we think that the discourse reflects a broad-based public conversation; indeed, the reader will observe that much PSA reporting is drawn from public forums about PSA—gatherings that are arguably designed to intervene in the considerable anxiety surrounding this field. We query: As South Koreans become increasingly aware of the stratification of PSA, will the broad-based appeal of PSA sustain itself? And, as importantly, how will the motivations, expectations, and experiences of PSA be transformed? We know, for example, that the PSA center of gravity has dramatically shifted away from North America toward Southeast Asia. Furthermore, current scholarship argues that this shift speaks to more than just proximity and cost savings. Recent analyses of PSA in Singapore suggest that Southeast Asia allows South Korean families to subvert the intimidating capital required in Western venues and to draw on the emotional capital and comfort in Asian venues. Southeast Asian locations also domesticate PSA in different ways: first, Asian locations promise regional or local globalization and second, South Korean children attending Singapore public schools acquire school discipline and rigor that translates very easily to traditional school success in South Korea. Interestingly, these differences in the Asian PSA field are in some ways echoed in recent findings about more longstanding PSA Western venues, suggesting that families have modulated their goals to be less akin to alternative human development or radical capital accumulation and more similar to travel-like “exposure” or “experience.” Also relevant is the rise of South Korean PSA in China (and other Chinese-speaking countries) which has focused on Chinese language acquisition. Both Yoonhee Kang’s and Sung-Yul Park and Sohee Bae’s recent studies discuss the ascendance of South Korean interest in Chinese language acquisition in Singapore, where both English and Chinese are official languages.

Not addressed in this paper, but an important recent development are the escalating efforts in South Korea to stem the tide of PSA by providing greater domestic
opportunities to master English and globalize. More literal forms of domestica-
tion are taking place in South Korea, namely the Yŏngŏ maŭl (English villages) and branch campuses of foreign universities. The first English village in South Korea opened in 2004. It provides a short-term English immersion experience in a live-in environment in which an English-only policy is strictly enforced. Offering students learning experiences with native speakers and living arrangements in a mock American (or European) town, these overnight camps are promoted as substitutes for expensive study abroad and accessible options for students from low-income families. However, as Dong-yeon Lee points out, English villages are being used as preparatory measures for “real” study abroad.\textsuperscript{12} Also noteworthy are the recent endeavors to bring branch campuses of Western schools to South Korea. For example, the Songdo global campus project hosts foreign university campuses in a designated district in the Incheon Free Economic Zone, two hours from Seoul. The University of North Carolina, the State University of New York at Stony Brook, and a few other American universities are opening branch campuses in 2010 and 2011. There are also plans to open foreign English-language high schools on Cheju Island. In the government-financed Jeju Global Education City, in which every resident, including the students, teachers, administrators, and clerks, will speak English only, twelve prestigious schools, mostly British and American private high schools, will open branch campuses by 2015. These Western educational institutions are expected to offer education comparable to that abroad but at lower costs, thus curbing the drain of dollars and manpower as well as drawing students from other Asian countries.\textsuperscript{13}

This article draws largely from South Korea’s premier conservative newspaper, The Chosŏn ilbo (hereafter Chosŏn).\textsuperscript{14} Over 400 news articles on PSA were published between 1994 and 2007. Among them, we focused on ninety-seven articles with a “human face” or stories about PSA students and parents. Although we analyze Chosŏn, we argue that the discourse reflects the larger social field of newspapers at large as well as both public and private discourse more generally.\textsuperscript{15} Analysis of other newspapers reveals that the discourse on PSA across the discursive field is quite consistent even in newspapers well known for ideologically divergent positions. Some would imagine, for example, that Chosŏn would celebrate neoliberal reforms and the naked interests of the upper classes, while the progressive Han’gyŏre sinmun and online Oh My News (O mai nyusŭ) would resist neoliberal education reforms in the name of equality and similarly denounce PSA as the unethical strategy of the rich. In this vein, for example, it would seem unlikely that Chosŏn would effectively orchestrate, as we suggest here, a conversation on the increasing bifurcation of class in South Korea. We concur with Jae Hoon Lim that when it comes to education-related journalism, political lines are not so clear-cut. Lim reviewed the early 1990s discourse of school breakdown, namely the widespread attention to problems including: the indifference and behavioral problems of students in class; the erosion of teachers’ authority, arguably caused by the lagging curriculum inept to equip students for
a competitive global economy; a number of failed education reforms; and the lack of discipline at home. She notes, for example, that advocates of very progressive de-schooling reforms and extreme neoliberalists call similarly for individualistic education programs; while “traditionalists” (i.e., those advocating traditional family values) and democratic reformists argue in parallel for communitarian reforms. This sort of convergence for PSA represents in part the sheer extent of PSA and PSA desires such that it cannot easily stand for a certain class fraction, as well as the considerable consensus that the South Korean mainstream education system with its egalitarian bent has been out of sync with the demands of the times. In this way, for example, it would be hard for a newspaper like Han’gyŏre sinmun to uniformly vilify PSA desires that span the class spectrum.

In considering the ideological confusion around PSA across a wide range of newspapers, we should also note that in South Korea—a relatively small, largely homogenous, highly literate, and intensively wired country—ideas quickly penetrate the population. Also relevant is that the newspapers reporting on PSA span the reporting genres, from editorials to advice pieces, to reporting on multivocal events, e.g., educational forums. As such, it is perhaps apt to think of newspaper discourse on PSA in the broader context of a marketplace of advice, concerns, chatting, and reflection that comprise a discursive field in which families make the complex decision to participate in PSA. Included in that field is a rich array of parent and children PSA accounts as well as many online information sites. Also noteworthy is that alongside newspaper reporting, and in many cases in dialogue with it, is a veritable explosion of books on the topic. In this way, the discourse we take up in this paper colors the experience of many who take or even merely contemplate the PSA path.

While the scholarship on PSA is still very young, considerably more extensive literature documents the somewhat parallel phenomenon in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 1990s. The children and families of this phenomenon have principally been described as “parachute kids” for children abroad alone and “satellite children” or “astronaut families” for cases in which children are abroad with one parent (similar to South Korea’s so-called geese families). Most well documented are the Hong Kong Chinese and Taiwanese in Canada where business/wealth immigration programs lured wealthy families—families later became transnational split families when one or both parents returned to Hong Kong for better work opportunities. The literature introduces a very privileged sector of families with greater economic leeway and citizenship flexibility than is the case of typical South Korean PSA families. The literature also describes the considerable political motivations among both Hong Kong and Taiwanese Chinese. Leading up to the 1997 return of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong Chinese were interested in securing a second passport. Additionally, for both Taiwanese and Hong Kong Chinese, the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre also motivated the desire to secure foreign passports. Furthermore, considerably lower rates of attendance at Hong Kong and to some extent Taiwanese universi-
ties made for greater pressure to exit with foreign college attendance in mind.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, the literature on the Taiwanese and Hong Kong case, based primarily on data from the 1990s, documents the super-elite who formed transnational split families as they secured a second citizenship and whose children settled into a long course of foreign pre-college and college education. The South Korean case appears to be distinctive for its broader class spectrum,\textsuperscript{24} its shorter-term nature such that children’s education is often a patchwork of years at home and abroad, for the less flexible legal status of parents (who are typically not permanent residents who can come and go at will), and for having one of the world’s highest rates of college attendance such that upper-tier or foreign university attendance is particularly desired. Our domestication argument makes sense then in the particular South Korean context of PSA’s proliferation across the class spectrum and the short-term nature of the stays (i.e., 1–3 years) such that PSA has become part of the fabric of South Korean K–12 education.

The limited scholarship on South Korean PSA has primarily examined family-level motivation and experience,\textsuperscript{25} lending little attention to the public discourse on PSA and to the increasing class diversification of this education migration.

THE CHANGING DEMOGRAPHY OF PRE-COLLEGE STUDY ABROAD: GLOBALIZATION, EDUCATION LIBERALIZATION, AND CLASS BIFURCATION

Before turning to the newspaper discourse itself, we offer a broad overview of relevant changes in South Korea since the 1990s. The arguments of this paper rest on the understanding of both the demography of PSA and larger education developments in South Korea over the last two decades. The movement of South Koreans abroad for a variety of experiences, from travel to short- and long-term study began to escalate in the 1990s, keeping pace with rising GNP per capita, liberalization of travel (i.e., the ability to get passports), and the state-supported globalization policy of the Kim Young Sam (Kim Yongsam) regime (1992–97).\textsuperscript{26} Broadly, the 1990s must also be appreciated as the first chapter of the radical democratization of South Korean society, albeit it was the 1997 election of opposition party leader Kim Dae Jung (Kim Taejung) that signaled what many consider the true achievement of democracy.\textsuperscript{27} With democratization came the rise of personal desires for individual expression and fulfillment beyond collectivistic demands, some of which took on lives of their own during the first wave of globalization and travel.\textsuperscript{28} The 1990s globalization also included South Korea’s competitiveness in terms of schooling and the workplace, and particularly of English mastery.\textsuperscript{29}

In this same period, the South Korean public school system, with its national curriculum, standardized tests, and equalization measures, was increasingly considered unable to address citizens’ clamor for more opportunities to prepare their
children for a changing world and to nurture their “individual” talents and proclivities. “School collapse” or “classroom collapse” described the mood at school in which both students and teachers were no longer successfully fulfilling their longstanding roles as dutiful learners and responsible educators, respectively. In response, since the late 1990s we note the rise of the private, after-school, supplementary market as well as the increasing call for changes in K–12 education including specialization, individualization, and stratification. In this early PSA phase, it is perhaps most accurate to summarize that families were managing their way abroad under the radar of legal restrictions that prohibited the formal exit from South Korean schooling. Studying abroad before college was illegal in South Korea until 2000. PSA in the 1990s was confined to a small group of elites who withdrew their children from school with the prospect of sending them to elite colleges in the United States or other developed counties. Loopholes and the paucity of PSA students facilitated the early path blazers of what would become much more widespread and liberally supported at the beginning of the millennium. With the increase of PSA in the late 1990s, the Ministry of Education proposed the complete liberalization of PSA in 1999. However, aspiring parents’ responses were so out of control that the proposal was turned down in the name of class opportunity division, the excessive expenditures for PSA, and the large national deficit. Currently only students who either graduated from middle school or have equivalent education credentials are technically permitted to study abroad at the family’s expense. Exceptions are made for middle school students with special talent in science, art, and sports and are thus recommended by their principal and recognized by the Ministry of Education. Another type of authorized PSA is relocation abroad with both parents in the case of employees of South Korean overseas corporate offices. However, these two forms of PSA constitute only a very small portion of the PSA influx. Most South Korean PSA cases are, scholars estimate, unauthorized; in other words PSA students go to boarding schools, stay with a guardian (usually arranged by PSA agencies), and, although much less common, are adopted by relatives already settled in host countries. Since the 2000s, as PSA has become more and more the practice of elementary school children, and the potential PSA problems of children who are abroad alone have become widely known, mothers began to accompany their children in ever greater numbers as the “managers” of their children, while the fathers work at home in South Korea. In the 2000s this so-called kirŏgi kajok (goose family), a family arrangement in which the mother accompanies her PSA children while the father stays in Korea to support them, has been considered a social problem by some observers. This type of unauthorized PSA is still widely practiced. According to a 2005 survey by Kim Hongwŏn, out of 122,358 children who were obliged to attend elementary school, as many as 11,278 requested a delay to enter school. What began in the early 1990s as fledgling relaxation of the supplementary education market (also known as the private after-school market), as well as the liberalization of foreign education imports, escalated during the Kim
Dae Jung regime. The escalating private after-school market, with near universal participation of South Korean children (even in primary school), has drastically transformed South Korean education which was historically known for its egalitarian, uniform nature. The highly stratified, private after-school sector readies children for both school success and college entrance examinations. The costs of this market, such that South Koreans have the highest education expenditures of any people in the world, are widely appreciated as the driving force of PSA. Many scholars have written about the irony that it was the first opposition regime in South Korea (of Kim Dae Jung) that would preside over the extreme market liberalization of society with the IMF crisis.

The IMF bailout, during the East Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, called for massive corporate liberalization and restructuring. This allowed for a more and more privatized education sector and greater state-supported responses to consumer education demand, including specialty schools, intensified English education opportunities, and more practical training in colleges. The IMF era also initiated intense class and social reproduction anxiety with radical increases in un- and underemployment (particularly of youth and women), the faltering confidence of the middle class, significantly decreased cash flow, and the increasing flexibilization of labor, all of which led to greater bifurcation of South Korea’s class system. Not surprisingly, in the immediate IMF aftermath, the rates of PSA slow down reflecting decreased cash flow and economic confidence. However, the absolute number of PSA students increased in spite of the IMF. Between 1998 and 2008, the number of South Korean elementary and secondary school students decreased from 8.5 million to 8.3 million. But during the same period, the number of Korean PSA students increased seventeen times, from 1,562 to 27,349. The sudden increases in PSA began in 2000 (with recovery from the IMF shock) and had the greatest percentage escalation in 2003–4. This reveals the context of the social and political changes occurring in post-IMF South Korea when all citizens were anxiously responding to the economic and social insecurities of the times.

Of the 27,349 students in 2008 leaving the country for PSA, 13,156 went to the United States, still the most popular destination. Experts note that the actual number is higher when the unreported, unsanctioned PSA students are considered. Meanwhile, critics note that the recent standstill in the number of exiting students (45,431 in 2006; 43,415 in 2007) might reflect the betrayed promise of PSA—that English and foreign degrees do not guarantee jobs either in the United States or in Korea.

Into this era of the escalation of the PSA, it is perhaps most accurate to suggest that simultaneously some restrictions were being relaxed to allow for “legally sanctioned” PSA, at the high school level, while other restrictions were being put in place for younger students. It is not an exaggeration to say that this PSA growth signaled a veritable educational, economic, and national crisis with many youth exiting Korea, taking with them their skills, money, and even possibly
their futures. A 2005 article warns with ambivalence: “If a PSA student academically succeeds in an advanced country, it repays the effort, but there are too many students falling by the wayside. The country should prevent this manpower drain and national tragedy.” Herein a crisis was sounded that continues into the present. It is in this moment of education liberalization (or what some would call neoliberalization) and class anxiety that PSA comes of age as a social phenomenon worthy of serious and widespread reflection and hence a considerable media discourse. We turn now to the changing and various discourses on PSA.

**EARLY-PHASE PSA**

As noted above, South Korea saw a steep increase in PSA since 2000, during which time the recovery from the IMF crisis, maturation of neoliberal reform, dissatisfaction with public education, and growing desires for cosmopolitan and globally competitive education converged. With these developments in mind, pre-2000 PSA can be considered early-phase PSA, compared with its popularization that developed into the 2000s and matured with 30 percent increases annually thereafter. The discourse we analyzed reveals a nuanced, but significant turnaround in 2001, corresponding, we argue, to the contextual changes discussed above. Early-phase *Chosŏn* PSA articles are characterized by two narratives, success stories which realize human development alternatives and escape/failure stories of “bad egg” rich kids. While success stories do continue to be told in much the same terms into the 2000s, failure stories of this earlier variety disappear.

**“Alternative” Human Development Abroad**

In this section we examine reporting primarily on the United States, the center of gravity of PSA in the early phase. We include post-2000 articles as well to show how this discursive stream has maintained itself into the present; we note, however, that it becomes increasingly overshadowed by “how to” and “how (un)likely to” succeed narratives.

Central to the alternative human development portrait of the transformed child is the nurturing crucible of alternative education abroad; the child comes into his or her own when wrested from the abuses of Korean education and society. A very early article on PSA success stories describes the personal attributes that PSA in the United States fosters, namely “democratic communication,” a culture of open debate, and individuals’ ability to speak up in public contrasted with the “scary,” “solemn,” and even “militaristic” style of South Korea. A returnee student, now a corporate official, is documented in the article for the personal attributes he nurtured abroad including his “international sensitivity,” favorable impression, and ability to be a “comfortable conversation partner” who puts oth-
ers at ease and even inspires them to want to dine with him.\textsuperscript{46} Similarly, a 2001 article on a public forum, entitled “No Future for the Current Education System,” stresses this sort of growth. By way of an example, it contrasts the South Korean child marooned in South Korean schooling with one in the United States who is “encouraged” to actively speak up and debate in a healthy manner.\textsuperscript{47}

As aforementioned, the theme of the transformed individual continues into the present as a healthy media stream. For example, in a 2007 article based on an open forum of PSA parents, one mother describes how in the United States the child’s principal or teacher checks in on the child daily about his or her coursework such that the PSA child became dutiful, courteous, and responsible and even willing to help with the dishes.\textsuperscript{48} In another case, also an article on a forum, the journalist summarizes that schools abroad (in this case one in the Philippines) respect children’s individuality, work to unearth each student’s talent, and support children’s school activities; all of this is contrasted with the standardized, monolithic, and discipline-centered education culture of South Korea. In the instance of the child in the Philippines, the mother is described as being moved to tears of joy as she watches evidence of her son’s newfound confidence in his videotaped speech at a school exhibition. Among the changes registered are those of the “once-introvert” child becoming social and active and one instance of a child who had been even unable to participate in a music performance exam in South Korea but had in one year abroad “changed completely.”\textsuperscript{49} Similarly, an article from New Zealand draws the contrast between South Korea’s standardized textbooks and New Zealand where in some schools children “make their own textbooks”; contrasted here again is the individualized, boutique nature of the foreign alternative against the rigid reality of South Korean schooling.\textsuperscript{50} The portrayed passivity of PSA students and parents is noteworthy. The transplanted students are nurtured and changed by the foreign soil, and parents are surprised to find out that their children have been transformed without their parent’s input.

\textbf{Early PSA Failure: The PSA “Escape”}

In contrast to the early and persistent image of the successful “alternative child,” another important early media stream that wanes into the present documents the child who was ill-suited to succeed from the outset. This child is not ripe for improvement by American society and schooling but rather is already a bad apple who has escaped abroad only to rot further. In the discourse on the successful child it is the American milieu itself that has produced positive effects, while in the case of failure it is the child’s own traits that have wreaked havoc.

In 1994, it was the crimes of PSA students upon their return to South Korea that first drew the general public’s attention to PSA. Pak Hansang became a symbol of a variant of PSA in which children turn away from their parents and become excessively materialistic, egocentric, and disrespectful. Using a method
he learned from an American movie, Pak murdered his parents during a sum-
ner break to inherit their wealth and pay off gambling debts he had amassed
in California.51 In the same year another article reported that a group of PSA
youth home for summer break had assaulted a driver when his “small moder-
ate car” passed their upscale car.52 In May of 1994 a sensationalistic newspaper
article deplored the “delinquency of escapist PSA students” and reported on
their underage consumption of alcohol and drugs, gang participation, and extravagant
spending of thousands of dollars in “even a single night.”53 Furthermore, PSA
students were charged with “importing gambling, drugs, violence, and other
exotic and infamous crimes.”54

In direct contrast with the discourse on the radically changed student abroad,
at issue here is instead that elite parents are motivated solely by success and have
little interest in character change. In this vein, one article portrays PSA as a dis-
torted example of “Korean parents’ excessive greed,” quoting the president of an
after-school institute who remarked, “U.S. high school officials do not understand
South Korean parents, who are interested only in the college admission rates but
do not care about the special characteristics of a school or whether their children
could adjust to a school.” Thus the escape/abuse narrative chides the elite South
Korean child who does not profit personally from his or her time abroad, and
manages instead to bring home the worst of the foreign scene.55 Finally, it is
noteworthy that in the domestication phase of PSA such blatant failure stories or
disapproval of PSA veritably disappear.

THE DOMESTICATION OF PSA

We turn now to articles culled from the 2000s, the era of PSA popularization.
We note the wane of alternative human development success and failure stories
and the emergence of two new discourses: the first which denaturalizes success
in a manual-like fashion to document “how to” succeed abroad; and the second
which queries the real likelihood of success in a somewhat sociological vein.
We note the irony that at the same time the newspapers emerged as voices of
practical PSA advice (“how to” columns began in 2005), it became increasingly
clear just how much parental and youth capital and investment were required
for successful PSA. Here we discuss three aspects of the domestication of PSA:
(1) education/knowledge capital—knowledge required for mobilizing effective
PSA (e.g., supplementary education and the timing of PSA); (2) characterologi-
cal capital—attributes children must have to succeed at PSA; and (3) parental
capital—assets that PSA parents must have in order to properly support their
children and PSA. Many of the articles we draw on in this section parallel the
Chosŏn critique of the Roh Moo-hyun regime (2002–7). The Roh Moo-hyun (No
Muhyn) administration, while tacitly allowing PSA to grow, tried to improve the
South Korean education system according to the very principles of equalization
and anti-corporatization (e.g., attempts to curb the private supplemental market). Chosŏn criticism frequently charges that equalization dampens “creativity and proactive will power” as well as denies students their proper education rights.\(^{56}\) Not surprisingly in the 2007 presidential election, the paper came out in support of Lee Myung-bak, overtly committed to the principles of privatization, hierarchization, and individuation in South Korean education.

From the mid-1990s, Chosŏn readers learned about many education reform proposals. Articles in 2004 and 2005 evoked the voices of renowned neoliberal advocate and scholar Kong Pyŏngho and Seoul National University President Chŏng Wunch’an who argue that consumer-demand-driven education would equip South Koreans with the skills necessary for success in the fierce global market economy. Again and again, equalization measures are to blame.\(^{57}\) Echoing earlier discourse, an article on a PSA forum details parents who blame South Korea’s education system for their exodus, foremost because they believe that the government stifles individual talent by demanding that students perform well across the board.\(^{58}\) Commonly portrayed in these cases is that PSA is an irrevocable tide, reflecting parents’ understandable desire for better education. Thus, parents’ demands and PSA are recognized and accommodated rather than rebuked. A 2005 editorial argues that the problem is not too many PSA students but the working class being deprived of the same access to PSA, which arguably undermines the democratic principles of freedom. As a solution, the editorial proposes the liberalization of international schools in South Korea, so that lower-class students can receive quality education while staying in Korea.\(^{59}\) Similarly, a 2007 editorial argues that open competition and neoliberal principles should govern education, and charges that Roh Moo-hyun’s Three Prohibition Policy—receiving college entrance exam perks in return for financial contributions, hierarchizing high schools, and offering university-administered exams in addition to the national college entrance exam—is on a par with prohibition in 1930s America. The author continues that these prohibitions are excessively committed to equality and restrain people’s desire for better education and healthy competition.\(^{60}\)

As even the mainstream media acknowledges PSA as a possible, and even necessary, path, students and parents are faced with a new array of challenges—this time more nuanced yet substantial. We suggest that as the reporting on PSA weighs the likelihood of PSA success, the PSA child is no longer the child who is infinitely malleable and able to transform under the “right” conditions abroad, but instead that he or she must already have the personal skills and characteristics required for success in school systems abroad. While the alternative human development discourse imagined a radical disjuncture between the child formed in the South Korean schooling environment and the Korean children in destination country school systems, these reports instead take stock of a child’s consistent school performance, for better or for worse, across the international divide. In this new view, parents must thus be informed...
and determined at very early stages of their children’s education to someday be able to ensure PSA success.

**Education/Knowledge Capital**

Critical PSA knowledge includes strategies for the ideal timing of study abroad and support by supplementary education services. For example, one article reports on the reality that even elite South Korean children can feel dwarfed in the school environment abroad. Parents are chided for their ignorance about both the school climate abroad and the personal attributes required for success.61 A 2004 article on the so-called new PSA pattern proposes that the combination of 1–2 years of PSA in elementary school, elite private high school in South Korea, followed by attendance at an elite American university is *the* optimal path. The article continues that this pattern promises children’s academic success, proper character development, and a healthy national identity.62 Similarly, a 2005 article asks parents to begin preparing their child for success as early as age five, with English-language materials at home, followed by “English after-school institutes centered on play during primary school, short term PSA in the fourth or fifth grade, and finally a longer term PSA experience in high school.”63

Appreciating that the desired human development abroad is not natural or inevitable, increasingly newspapers report, in a how-to fashion, just how much effort this project requires. As one 2004 article put it, “Most PSA students are going from one afterschool to another, studying from morning to night, and receiving private lessons on the weekends.”64 A 2007 article reports that over 60 percent of PSA students in the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and China are getting formal help from after-school education services. The article elaborates that, moreover, many PSA students who left South Korea to escape from the after-school market return for private tutoring at an even higher cost.65 Another article noted in 2006 that 44.4 percent of children return to South Korea during breaks and receive extra-curricular education services.66 In this way, education abroad is managed and supported by the same knowledge and capital that are well understood to be the special characteristics of South Korean schooling and ironically for some the very motivation to exit the South Korean system.67

Recent articles on the supplemental education support needed for successful PSA take stock of the competition of that market. For example, a 2007 article stresses that it is not only South Korean PSA students who take advantage of supplementary education abroad but also domestic elites. The article continues that PSA students face a very particular competition abroad, namely competition among the PSA students themselves. A quote from one parent is telling: “Not only junior high or high school students, but also about 80 percent of elementary school [PSA] students receive private tutoring, which is *no different from Korea and we still have the problem of competing against other Korean kids even in a foreign country.*”68
In a series of other recent articles, we note the sense that the South Korean competitive education milieu has simply transmigrated abroad. Remarkably, a series of special reports document that the most prestigious supplementary education academies in Flushing, New York, a city with one of the largest Korean concentrations in the United States, are increasingly dominated by students from China and India, students dubbed “Chindia (China + India)” in these articles, with Koreans taking a back seat.69

These articles document PSA practices both at home and abroad and make it clear that class matters. In the era of intensified PSA demands, success is more likely for wealthier South Korean elites who can afford expensive private tutoring at home in addition to supplementary education expenses in the host country.

Characterological Capital

With PSA maturation, we note that success stories begin to look different, championing not only the children who have availed themselves of the best educational knowledge, but also the children who bring personal characteristics well suited to PSA success. Celebrated are the individual characteristics of the South Korean exceptional child who “has what it takes” to succeed in the United States. The particular assets at issue are those that are well suited to the neoliberal era, such as self-management and creativity.70

In a 2007 article, “The PSA Success Story of Ch’oe Chihun Who Entered Phillips Exeter Academy,” we are introduced to the extreme preparation, including watching two American films over a hundred times each, and another fifty films over fifty times each, of a boy who eventually finds his way to an elite preparatory school. Ch’oe’s attributes—persistence, extreme preparation, tenacity, and talents (particularly for memorization)—are ones that are reported as inherent to the child.71 A 2006 article solicits reflection from a PSA mother in Canada, who underscores the importance of these characterological assets as she sets out to correct the common South Korean misperception that “foreigners are open to all manner of expression and behavior.” Instead she argues that there are definite “fundamentals and principles” corresponding to the “proper character” that PSA students already need to have in order to succeed. The article goes on to report that many PSA students lack these flourishes. They are unable, for example, to say “Hi” to strangers or to express their gratitude. Acclaimed assets of PSA students, such as self-management and clear goals, then, are introduced as PSA prerequisites—not achievements.72

Parental/Maternal Capital

Implicated in the above discussion of both the knowledge and character traits that PSA requires is the ideal PSA parent who can manage all of this and perhaps shares these personal characteristics herself. One subset of articles argues spe-
cifically that the ideal South Korean PSA parent is one who can stand above the “rumor mill,” namely normative ideas and information about successful PSA in general or in a specific location. We note the irony of media discourse postulating that the ideal parent, particularly the mother, is one who pays little or no heed to the media.

In a 2005 interview, Kong Pyŏngho, father of a PSA student and prominent neoliberal scholar, charges the parent with both making a “language room in their child’s brain” and teaching the child a musical instrument so as to assure the child has the sensibility (kamsŏng) required for today’s world. He goes on in some detail to describe the intimate challenges of fashioning the ideal child who can survive “in the fast-paced world in which instability has become routine.” Kong turns to child rearing to argue that parents must have enormous foresight and not bow to the short-term whims of their children. He notes that even though his children sometimes disagreed with him, they later appreciated his decision and are proud of themselves.73

We turn now to a discussion of the “typical” PSA parent who is held hostage by the PSA rumor mill contrasted with the ideal parent who has the acumen, skill, and other personal assets that allow her to self-style a PSA course for her child. Implied is that it is precisely the anxious follower who is not likely to succeed at PSA, hence the title of one 2007 article: “Only Dead Fish Follow the Flow of the River.” This article suggests that the robust population of PSAers driven by nothing but parental peer pressure follow at their own peril because PSA demands much more than passive mimicry. The same article, for example, reports on someone who doubts the likelihood of success in the case of one of her friends who she describes as “not such an overeager education mother,” but rather “a timid woman who knew only of home and church and could do nothing without her husband.”74

The ideal PSA parent should then “listen to the experiences of others, advice from students and parents in the host country, and to the concerns of other parents, but . . . should not blindly trust them.”75 The parent must be “open-minded,” know her child, and share “open conversation” with her. In this way, it is no longer just parental know-how, but parental characteristics—ones that mirror ideal characteristics for the PSA child—that can alone assure success.76 Interestingly, the discussion of the rumor mill also takes up ethnic comparison; it is Korean parents who fall prey to rumors while their Indian and Chinese counterparts actively seek resources by participating in PTA and educational board meetings.77

In the light of these sorts of articles, it is no surprise that it is increasingly the parent-accompanied PSA student that is heralded as the most likely to succeed.78 A 2002 article reports on a parent’s epiphany: I had better “take care of my child myself.”79 Another article documents a PSA child who says to her parents, “I’m more proud of you than you’re proud of me.” She continues to review her struggles in New Zealand and how her parents transformed her from an ordinary child into “a girl with confidence and dreams.”80 With this article, what is made
evident is that parental management of the supplementary education sector is not only a matter of economic capital but indeed also that of daily social and emotional management.81

As the PSA discourse on “what it takes” comes of age we note that some journalists are unabashed to assert that given the assets required, those not up to the task should stay at home. One 2005 article admonishes those who are “unprepared for PSA” and “wasting money on PSA” and charges that “Korean society must seriously consider the right way to send kids for PSA.”82

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have examined how the discourse on PSA has been domesticated in the context of both its popularization and South Korea’s ever more anxious social and economic climate. For the pre-IMF phase in which PSA was still a global “alternative,” we noted twin discourses of success and failure. The success narrative focused on the portrait of a creative and positive alternative, while the failure story highlighted the ills of the South Korean elite and children who were unlikely to succeed in any environment.

As PSA comes of age in the 2000s, it is becoming apparent that education abroad requires many of the same investments that allow for education success at home. We characterize this maturation of the PSA discourse as one that appreciates both the inevitability of PSA desires and the often enormous challenges of the successful actualization of the PSA strategy. Through these discourses, PSA has become domesticated such that its demands, realities, and outcomes are increasingly seen as subject to the very circumstances of life and education in South Korea. Ironically, as it is domesticated, “successful” PSA becomes a nearly unattainable object of desire: the stuff of “other” people with greater know-how, force of character, and more refined strategies. In this way, PSA reveals the escalating sense of inequality in South Korea in which the trappings of a middle-class life are both less accessible and harder to sustain. Simultaneously, this discourse offers a critique of international education for fortifying class interests.

The anxieties inspired by PSA are understood to be ones that have led to policy changes at home. Indeed, today South Korea offers an education regime that is more than ever inclined to privatization and individuation—namely, effecting the very changes that have supposedly driven the PSA education exodus. A central tenet of the 2007 presidential campaign of Lee Myung-bak (who won by a landslide) was his commitment to an education policy that reflected his overall principle of privatization and liberalization. While Roh regulated the growth of specialty and private high schools, measures which many argue only led to the further extension of the private after-school supplementary system, Lee proposed total deregulation.83 Among Lee’s many education policies, it was his proposal for public English education that prompted the greatest public debate.
He proposed the reinforcement of English education at school: providing over three hours of English per week beginning in the third grade; teaching multiple subjects in English (i.e., immersion English learning) at high schools; investing 5 trillion won (4 billion dollars) in official English education at school; recruiting 23,000 new English teachers capable of teaching English in English; and establishing a government-administered English aptitude test. These many measures were designed to suppress private after-school, supplant PSA, and equip students for a globalizing world.84 The plan has been criticized for its overemphasis on English in the public school curriculum and for the implausibility of administering immersion English classes.85 Paradoxically, however, some argue that these new measures have only intensified parental English-related anxiety and fueled the private after-school market; indeed many institutes even mention these measures in their advertising.86 Others criticize that the reformation of the English curriculum alone will do little to curb PSA, a phenomenon driven by much larger forces.87 We can summarize that the state is attempting to change education policies at home, which are designed to stem the PSA trend, while simultaneously furthering the liberalization and privatization of the South Korean education sector in ways that accommodate PSA desires.88 These developments at home can be seen as with one hand stemming the PSA trend, with the other cultivating the very conditions for its greater escalation at home.

These above developments reveal the extent to which PSA is but one “choice” in a landscape of ever greater education alternatives and individuation. We predict—and some of the newspaper discourse above already shows—that over time the differences between PSA and newly emerging options at home will not seem so obvious. All options, we envision, will be seen as the skills, characteristics, and management necessary for a global era. As such, PSA will neither offer an easy alternative, nor will even radically liberalized options at home seem so very different.

NOTES

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1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are our own.

2. We are grateful to one reviewer who pointed out that a discourse of alternative human development in no way precludes more narrow interest in class reproduction or mobility at home. While we agree, we nonetheless think it is important to note the changing terms of “success” over time. For a discussion of the mobility of international students as a part of the larger transnational processes of globalization, see Samuel Collins, “Bridges to Learning,” 398–417.


5. Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship.


7. One reviewer noted that changes in the United States have likely curbed short-term study abroad, including the post-9/11 changes in immigration policy which make it harder for South Korean children to attend U.S. public schools.


14. Politically, Chosŏn ilbo has consistently supported South Korea’s conservative party, advocated economically for the free market and open competition, and culturally advanced the maintenance of “Korean tradition” and nationalism.

15. Chosŏn ilbo represents the PSA discourse found in a wide range of popular media, from reports by educational and governmental organizations to newspapers, women’s magazines, and online communities. In 2002, South Korea’s broadcast television and newspapers undertook campaigns addressing these issues, such as the Korea Broadcasting Station’s “We can’t leave education as it is” and the Munhwa Broadcasting Company’s “Save education, save the future.”


17. Whereas the earlier PSA reports in Han’gyŏre and Oh My News in the late 1990s and early 2000s largely disapproved of PSA, since the mid-2000s they have highlighted students’ aptitude and motivation as keys to PSA success and demanded that parents be able to evaluate their children’s potential for PSA success. In an op-ed, entitled, “Children Studying Abroad and Parent Responsibility,” published in Han’gyŏre sinmun in 2007, former Prime Minister Cho Sun (Cho Soon) rebukes parents who blame faltering education policies for the justification of PSA. He contends that the larger problem lies in the quality of family discipline that failed to nurture children’s “sound emotions, wholesome values, and healthy bodies.” Articles in two sources vindicate PSA parents on the grounds that Korean education cannot meet reasonable expectations, e.g., “Songmulchŏgin kŭdŭl ŭl yokhal su ŏmnŭn iyu.” They also highlight the parents’ responsibility for knowing the...
child and designing the right PSA path for the children, e.g., “I chu ūi kyoyuk t’ema: chogi yujak.” Yi Nami, “Yi Nami ūi ērūn saenggak, ai maŭm”; “Nara pak kyoyuk p’unggyông: ai ūi chabalchŏk tonggi ka chogi yuhak sŏngp’ae karŭm.”


19. Eighteen of these articles are editorials or invited opinion pieces; twelve are from special reports on PSA or South Korean education with a focus on PSA; and eight are advice columns on PSA by PSA specialists as well as reporters, which are new genres that began appearing in 2005. While some articles synthesize PSA voices (i.e., those of parents, children, and experts), others simply report in a more neutral fashion on these voices; the latter is particularly the case for reporting on public forums about PSA, many of these organized by Chosŏn itself. When we cite the perspective of an individual voice, rather than the synthetic perspective of an article, we indicate this clearly. Attention to the titles of even those articles that largely feature independent voices is indicative of more synthetic perspectives. In our review of newspaper discourse, we thus pay careful attention to the status of the discourse as either the editorial opinion of journalists or the more prevalent journalistic reports of both popular and expert voices on PSA.

20. See Chŏng Haengja, Han’guk esŏ t’aeŏnan; Yi Sŏnhŭi, Na ūi sŏntaek chein ūi sŏnggong.


27. Hagen Koo, State and Society in Contemporary Korea.

31. “Chogi yuhak chungjol isang man hŏyong.”
32. In recent years we observe an increase in the number of Korean mothers attending American universities to pursue graduate degrees or to learn English. “Study mother” is increasingly considered as an optimal route for a PSA mother, because her children can attend public school, and she can obtain better English skills and serve as a role model for her children. We have not found conclusive data on Korean study mothers, but Huang and Yeoh noted “study mother” as Chinese educational mothers’ strategy. Shirlena Huang and Brenda S. Yeoh, “Transnational Families and Their Children’s Education.”
33. The U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 placed significant restrictions on foreign students’ access to U.S. public elementary and secondary schools. Nonimmigrant foreign students (PSA students typically fall into this category) cannot attend a public school for more than twelve months and should provide evidence that they paid the tuition and fees in full in advance. Those who received a student visa to attend a private school cannot transfer to a public school. Furthermore, prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many foreign nationals would enter the United States on a tourist visa and later apply for a student visa. However, in the wake of 9/11, visitors admitted to the United States under tourist visas are prohibited from taking classes at any public school or vocational school until their change in visa application has been approved. These changes induced the rise of PSA agencies that match legal guardians with U.S. citizenship to students, which allowed the students to attend public schools, while some parents let their children be legally adopted by American relatives.
35. So Jin Park, “Mothers’ Anxious Education Management.”
38. Since the late 1990s, private high schools, foreign language high schools, and science high schools emerged as alternatives to failing public education. These specialty schools, often criticized as “aristocratic prep schools,” were considered an efficient route to elite colleges in South Korea. Han Manjung, “Kyoyuk kaebang kwa ch’odŭng kyoyuk.” Also, as college students sought English education as a means to procuring a job, private English institutes targeted at college students and employees flourished. In response, South Korean colleges initiated—or radically expanded—intensive English education. See for example, Alan Brender, “Gyeongsang National University”; Alan Brender, “To Compete, South Korean Universities Step Up Use of English.” But the globalization efforts of higher education are not without controversy; see, for example, Samuel Collins, “Who’s This Tong-il?” 417–29; Terri Kim, “Internationalization of Higher Education in South Korea,” 89–103.
40. In 1998, the number of PSA students was 1,562; in 1999—1,839; in 2000—4,397; in 2001—10,132; in 2003—10,498; in 2004—6,446; in 2005—20,400; in 2006—29,511; in 2007—27,668; and 27,349 in 2008. Data shows that the upsurge is particularly prominent among younger students. In 2006, 13,814 elementary school students left for PSA (3,464 elementary school students left in 2002), while 9,246 middle school students and 6,451 high school students left for the same reason (3,301 and 3,367 left in 2002). “Ch’anggan 19-chunyŏn: chogi yuhak pit kwa kŭnŭl”; Pak Changsŏp, “Chogi Yuhak 3 man myŏng yukbak.”

41. Of the PSA students leaving Korea in 2008, 12,531 were elementary students, 8,888 were middle school students, and 5,930 were high school students.

42. Kim Sangmok, “Han’guk ch’o-jung-ksaeng chogi yuhak miyukhaeng 2-nyŏn yŏnsok kamsose.”

43. Sim Hyŏkki, “Kangnam yuhaksaeng wae chulŏdũn?” This set of statistics present different numbers from other articles in Chosŏn, for example, “Ch’anggan 19-chunyŏn” and Pak Changsŏp, “Chogi yuhak 3-man myŏng yulpak.” In fact, surveys yield different data on the number of PSA students. We appreciate this pattern as a reflection of the current state of PSA, with various exit strategies, including legal PSA, family migration for the purpose of education, unreported withdrawal from school, mothers’ obtaining legal status as students, and adoption by relatives.

44. See “Ach’im nondan: uri kyoyuk, chŏlmang ppun in’ga?”

45. “Cheil chedang ch’oeyŏno isa.”

46. Ibid.

47. “Kyoyuk idaeron mirae ópta 1-pu: pŏrim padŭn Han’guk kyoyuk,” 3.


51. Ch’a Hakpŏng, “Paeryun ch’unggyŏk: Ton apen pumto ó pŏpŏta.”

52. “Orenji hyangnak ŭro chisaenda.”

53. “Top’isŏng yuhaksaeng t’alsŏn idaero cho’un’ga?”

54. “Orenji hyangnak ŭro chisaenda.”


56. “Sasŏl: kyoyuk sŏnt’aekkwŏn ŭopsŭni haeoe ro kal su pakke.”

57. “Hoegilchŏk p’yŏngjunwha ka kych’ung idong mak’a”; “Konggyoyuk wigi t’ongnyŏhan pansŏng’ Kim taet’ongnyŏng”; “Hwaje ŭi ch’ae, 10-yŏnhu Han’guk.”

58. “2007 Kyoyuk sirijŭ.”

59. “Siron: ‘Han’gukpyŏng’ ch’iryoyak ŭin chayu hwaktae.”

60. “Ach’im nondan: kwangnan ŭi kŭmjubŏp kwa ttok talmun sambul.”

61. “Kyoyuk idaeron mirae ópta.”

62. “Sae yuhak p’aet’ŏn; ch’odŭng kohak nyŏnttæ 1–2 nyŏn yuhak.”

63. “Chŏllyak choaya yuhak sŏnggonghanda.”

64. “Paenk’ubŏ esŏ ponaen p’yŏnji.”

65. “Chogi yuhaksaeng 64% hyŏnjī sŏdo ‘kwaoe.’”

66. “Mi chogi yuhak kokyoasang tŭl panghak maja nŏdo nado yut’ŏn.”

68. “Yesanch’ŏ ’chogi yuhak.’” Emphasis added.
69. “Ch’india’e millinŭn Han’guk chogi yuhaksaeng 1”; “Ch’india e millinŭn Han’guk chogi yuhaksaeng 2.”
70. “Kyoyuk idaeron mirae ëpta.”
71. “Miguk sarip myŏngmun’go ‘P’ilripsŏ Eksit’ŏ hapkyŏkhan Ch’oe Chihun kun chogi yuhak sŏnggonggi.”
72. “Mujakkŏng.”
73. “Hwijŏng.”
75. “Mujakkŏng.”
76. “Paenk’ubŏ esŏ.”
77. “Ch’india e millinŭn Han’guk chogi yuhaksaeng 2.”
78. “Pak Yŏngju ŭi yuhak k’allŏm.”
79. “Yuhak kan nae ai hyŏnji só tolboketta’ hapkumo Yŏng’ŏ kongbu pum.”
80. “Yun Hyŏnu yang chogi yuhak sŏnggonggi.”
81. “Chogi yuhaksaeng 64% hyŏnji sŏdo ’kwaoe.’”
82. “[Chogi yuhak kaidŭ] Miguk, naesin, t’op’ŭl choaya myŏngmun hakkyo kanda.”
83. “Yi Myŏngbak tangsŏnja kyoyuk chŏngch’aeck ottŏk’e toena.”
84. “Insuwi, pandaeron ŭmnnu ‘Yŏngŏ t’oronhoe’ wae hana.”
85. “Kŭbun tŏl hyŏnjang ŭl molado nŏmu morŭnŭnde . . .”
87. Kang Chŏrwŏn, “Sae chŏngbu ch’ulbŏm hu chŏng’uk kakchi sŏ munŭi kŭpchŭng.”

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